Libya
I. Introduction
1. Libya, located in North Africa, faces significant challenges from climate change that will impact the country’s ability to ensure the promotion and fulfilment of human rights, including economic and social rights to adequate shelter, health, food and water, and the right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment. Libya should identify areas where climate change will affect human rights and adopt management and response programs that center the protection of these rights.
2. Further, the effects of climate change on food and on Libya’s exports will impact fundamental international legal rights including the permanent sovereignty over natural resources, an essential component of the right to self-determination. Libya should develop programs to safeguard its resources and explore international legal avenues to seek reparations from the damages caused by high-emissions countries.
3. Compounding these environmental challenges is ongoing political turmoil, characterized by a divided government, protracted conflict, and the presence of armed groups.[1] Instability threatens civil and political rights, hinders effective responses to climate-related issues, and can lead to forced migration, thus undermining economic, social and cultural rights (“ESC rights”).
II. Projected Climate Impact
4. As one of the driest and most water-stressed countries in the world, Libya is particularly susceptible to drought, with less 2% of the country receiving enough rainfall to sustain agriculture.[2] Environmental disasters, including floods, sandstorms, landslides, and desertification, are becoming more frequent and intense.[3] For example, in September 2023, Storm Daniel unleashed severe rainfall and floods, leading to the catastrophic collapse of two aging dams in eastern Libya, devastating the city of Derna and its surrounding areas.[4]
5. Experts project that by 2060, Libya’s mean temperature could rise by 1.42°C to reach approximately 24.34°C, with the potential to soar as high as 25.61°C.[5] This increase will likely result in more frequent droughts, dust storms, and extreme heat days, further intensifying desertification.[6] Moreover, mean annual precipitation is expected to decrease by 7% by 2050, although the intensity of rainfall events may increase.[7]
6. Libya’s water demand already exceeds its renewable supply, and projections suggest that water scarcity will worsen.[8] This threatens agricultural productivity and access to safe drinking water, sanitation, hygiene, and public health.[9]
7. Libya’s coastal areas, low mountains, and scattered oases represent the most densely populated regions, yet they suffer from high levels of land degradation. Desertification poses a severe threat to food security and exacerbates existing vulnerabilities.[10]
8. The climate crisis will affect Libya’s ability to safeguard ESC rights, including rights to adequate shelter, health, dignified work, and adequate food and water. We encourage Libya to take a rights-centric approach to mitigating the effects of climate change.
9. Climate change threatens permanent sovereignty over natural resources by altering the availability and distribution of vital resources like water and land, including from rising sea levels.
10. Ultimately, climate change will erode the right to self-determination on account of territory and resource loss. Upholding this fundamental right will require addressing climate change and rethinking self-determination, particularly for populations displaced by climate-related phenomena.[11]
III. Effects on Libya’s Economy and Human Rights
11. With a population of approximately 7.4 million,[12] Libya’s economy heavily depends on oil production, agriculture, and fisheries.[13] However, the effects of climate change on the production of key exports and goods threaten livelihoods, food security, and regional stability.[14]
12. Libya should reduce its reliance on nonrenewable resources and diversify its economy.[15] Libya has recently taken steps towards sustainable development and climate mitigation,[16] however, the pressures of climate change necessitate greater action. Economic diversification through agriculture, technology, and green industries will enhance Libya’s resilience to climate-related disruptions, create sustainable jobs, improve social well-being, and reduce poverty. Adaptive strategies for water management, agriculture, and infrastructure will strengthen Libya’s ability to cope with climate change while ensuring the well-being of its citizens and the future stability of its economy.
a) Agriculture and Food Resources
13. Libya’s agricultural sector has seen a sharp decline in its share of GDP, from 5.2% in 2002 to just 1.8% in 2023.[17]Ongoing conflict, urbanization, and climate change have severely impacted farming, especially in drought-prone areas.
14. Despite these challenges, efforts to revive the sector and improve food security continue.[18] While Libya’s ongoing instability and the absence of a clear national strategy pose limitations, innovative agricultural projects, such as Green Paradise Libya’s hydroponic farming, offer promising solutions to address food security and create employment.[19]For example, the AgroLEAP pilot in Sabha launched in 2024 features the first-ever solar panel systems dealmaking event for agriculture.[20]
15. Extreme weather events, such as consistent droughts, alongside the destruction of key infrastructure, such as water tanks and wells during conflict, have also left farmers without essential resources to sustain their farms.[21] We urge Libya to consider frameworks that can ameliorate these issues and promote food sovereignty.
16. Food sovereignty, as defined in the Nyéléni Declaration (2007), helps to ensure access to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through sustainable methods. Strengthening local production reduces dependency on imports and enhances self-sufficiency. Key strategies include further investment in sustainable irrigation to combat water shortages, extending additional support to small-scale farmers, diversifying crops, and strengthening food distribution networks to ensure food reaches all communities, especially in conflict-affected areas.
b) Water Resources
17. Libya faces severe water scarcity due to its lack of rivers and minimal annual rainfall (less than 100 mm on average).[22] The population, concentrated along the coastal regions, relies heavily on groundwater, but over-extraction, seawater intrusion, and inefficient water usage exacerbate the crisis. A lack of clear strategy and institutional frameworks further contributes to Libya’s water crisis.[23] In 2012, Libya’s water demand significantly outpaced its available supply, with agriculture consuming the vast majority.[24]
18. Providing around 60 percent of Libya’s freshwater needs, the Man-Made River Project (“MMRP”) exploits water from non-renewable aquifers that cannot be recharged by rain.[25] Despite being one of the world’s largest civil engineering projects, it nevertheless fails to meet national demands. In addition, residents in coastal cities remain skeptical about its quality, using it mainly for non-drinking purposes due to concerns about inadequate treatment and regular analysis. [26]
19. Ongoing conflicts in southern Libya have led to deliberate disruptions in the water supply, worsening conditions for citizens in Tripoli and other coastal cities.[27] Repeated attacks on the MMRP rendered 190 wells out of service, bringing this vital sector to the brink of collapse.[28] In fact, the protracted conflict has led to numerous water cuts and infrastructure destruction that have impacted millions of people.[29]
20. Libya’s water crisis, exacerbated by higher temperatures and diminished rainfall,[30] poses serious public health risks, including the spread of waterborne diseases, and hampers economic recovery, as agricultural productivity declines and basic services deteriorate.[31] Addressing water scarcity in Libya requires immediate humanitarian interventions as well as long-term strategies focused on sustainable water management and conflict resolution.
21. While Libyan law[32] regulates water usage and access, stronger links to ESC rights are needed. Access to clean and safe water is essential for public health, dignity and preventing diseases. Water scarcity directly threatens food security, livelihoods, industries like agriculture and manufacturing, leading to economic instability. Children in rural areas may spend time collecting water instead of attending school, impacting education. Cultural practices and traditions tied to water, such as communal gatherings and religious rituals, can also be disrupted. Therefore, safeguarding Libya’s water resources through sustainable management, investment in infrastructure, and equitable distribution is crucial to social stability and human rights protection.
c) Oil and Gas Exploration
22. While Libya contributes minimally to the greenhouse gas emissions causing climate change, it has Africa’s highest per capita greenhouse gas emissions, largely due to the oil and electricity sector. The release of natural gas during oil production is a major contributor to these emissions.
23. Gas flaring and venting during oil production is wasteful and harmful, contributing around 350 million tons of carbon annually.[33] Libya’s barrel to flare ratio, increased from 2.3 to 5.9 million m3/year between 2016 to 2019 and places it among the higher polluters.[34] Further, the eastern towns Jikharra, Awjila, and Jalu, home to 30,000 people, suffer from poor environmental conditions as a result of nearby oil and gas operations.[35]
24. Fuel smuggling is also a significant issue, driven by economic instability, high domestic fuel prices, and a thriving black market. Despite vast oil reserves, Libya struggles with fuel shortages due to inadequate infrastructure and political fragmentation. Fuel, sold at subsidized prices domestically, is often smuggled across borders into neighboring countries for higher profit.[36]
25. However, due to its dependence on oil exports, Libya, along with Iraq, has the highest exposure to global oil price fluctuations.[37] Libya’s ability to finance its inflated budget is highly dependent on oil prices remaining above USD $50 per barrel.[38] Peak oil, a term which refers to the time when global production reaches its maximum rate after which it will decline, is therefore a major threat to Libya’s economy.[39]
26. The exploitation of limited oil and natural gas resources, alongside climate change, threatens Libya’s energy stability.[40] Without alternative energy investments, Libya’s dependence on fossil fuels increases its vulnerability.
27. The International Energy Agency (“IEA”) recommends cost-effective measures to reduce emissions up to 71% at no net cost.[41] We encourage Libya to follow these recommendations and foster conditions to implement a “just transition.” Noting that Libya also has a right to develop, a just transition to green energy may be a viable strategy to help Libya diversify its economy, and further ensure and promote the right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment.[42]
28. Shifting to green energy is not incompatible with Libya’s right to development. As Libya is a developing country and recognized as a non-Annex I country under the Kyoto Protocol, it is not obligated to meet emission reduction targets under the agreement.[43] While obligations may arise under the Paris Agreement and the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, Libya has the freedom to foster a responsible just energy transition while improving social equity, ensuring a sustainable and resilient future.
d) Migrant Rights
29. Libya serves as both a destination and a transit point for migrants from across Africa.[44] The country’s strategic location on the Mediterranean makes it a hub for migrant smuggling and human trafficking. Yet significant fatalities are reported on both Libyan coastal and land routes,[45] where migrants also face significant risks for gender-based violence and modern slavery. Migrants in Libya fleeing internal conflicts and conflicts in neighboring states[46] have the difficult decision of braving conditions at sea or remaining in an unstable environment.[47]
30. Though only a small proportion of migrants identified slow onset environmental degradation (2%) (e.g., drought, water scarcity and changing rainfall patterns) or sudden natural disasters,[48] this is likely an underestimate. Many migrants whose migration journey is directly or indirectly related to climate change cite economic drivers, such as the lack of job opportunities and rural unemployment—which can be closely linked to climate-related hazards and environmental factors—as their primary motive for migration.[49]
31. The 2023 Derna floods exposed Libya’s vulnerability to climate change and the need for more effective governance by two rival administrations.[50] The divided government response to the Derna flooding partially excluded refugees and migrants, who faced discrimination in access to government support.[51]
32. The International Organization for Migration (“IOM”)[52] recommends strengthening local governance through capacity building, technical support, cross-institutional coordination, and conflict prevention. Investment in water and waste management infrastructure would alleviate strain on host communities and reduce resource conflicts. In addition, fostering participatory cooperation by engaging local leaders, the public sector, and migrant populations will promote social cohesion, while mitigating intercommunal tensions. Finally, prioritizing widespread access to high-quality, publicly available data will enable evidence-based policymaking. Gender, lifecycle, and national origin must be considered in policy design and programming to address the distinct challenges faced by women, girls, and various migrant groups.
33. We affirm these recommendations and further emphasize the need to uphold fundamental rights of cross-border displaced persons, including due process in asylum processes and access to dignified detention facilities. Migrants must be assisted on the basis of non-discrimination; and Libya must uphold the principle of non-refoulement and prohibit collective expulsions. We additionally recognize that the Libyan government may require financial and capacity-building support of the international community.
34. Libya should also reconsider its existing externalization agreements with European Union Member States. The 2017 Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding provides Libya’s coast guard with technical and financial support to curb migration flows, intercept migrants at sea, and prevent departures, yet lacks references to the right to asylum. Judicial authorities in Italy have repeatedly found the MoU in violation of migrants’ human rights.[53] Future agreements must ensure compliance with international human rights law, preventing inhumane treatment and arbitrary detention.
e) Human Rights-Centric Adaptation and Mitigation Strategies
35. Libya signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) in 2015 and ratified the Paris Agreement in 2021. We commend Libya for adopting the international climate change governance framework.
36. Political reconciliation and unification would advance climate adaptation plans and disaster response strategies across Libya. Cooperation on climate change could provide opportunities for divided government institutions to collaborate, supported by international actors like the United Nations Security Council and the UN Support Mission in Libya.
37. Libya has not materially contributed to global climate change,[54] accounting for just 0.1%[55] of global CO2 emissions, yet faces severe human rights impacts stemming from climate-related issues. High-emission States bear legal responsibility for systemic climate changes that adversely affect vulnerable countries like Libya.
38. We encourage Libya to apply for financial assistance under the Loss and Damage Fund and also seek financial and technical support to transition to renewables under the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement.
39. We urge Libya to secure financial support for climate adaptation, mitigation, and sustainable development while holding high-emission states accountable for their climate commitments.
40. We urge Libya to consider what injuries it may have sustained or is currently sustaining from the conduct of high-emissions States.
IV. Recommendations
41. Diversify the Economy: Invest in renewable energy sources like solar and wind power to reduce dependency on nonrenewable resources, mitigate climate change and promote long-term economic stability, to promote and defend economic self-determination and economic sovereignty.
42. Enhance Agricultural Sustainability: Strengthen support for small-scale farmers, promote sustainable irrigation practices, and diversify crops to reduce climate risks and improve food security.
43. Ensure Food Sovereignty: Align agricultural practices with the principles of food sovereignty by encouraging local food production, reducing reliance on imports, and addressing food distribution challenges, particularly in conflict-affected areas.
44. Promote Water Resource Management: Develop adaptive strategies for water management, including improving infrastructure, optimizing groundwater use, and investing in desalination and rainwater harvesting systems to combat water scarcity and protect the human right to water.
45. Reduce Carbon Emissions in Oil and Gas: Implement cost-effective measures to reduce gas flaring and methane emissions in oil and gas production, as proposed by the IEA, aiming for a significant reduction in Libya’s carbon footprint to align with the goals of the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement.
46. Foster a Just Transition to Green Energy: Encourage the development of green energy industries and invest in technology to reduce emissions, with a focus on ensuring social equity and a just transition for workers in fossil fuel sectors.
47. Strengthen Migrant and Refugee Rights: Improve protection for migrants, refugees, and internally displaced persons by ensuring access to services, non-discriminatory assistance, and upholding international human rights standards, including the prohibition of forced expulsions.
48. Build Governance Capacity for Climate Adaptation: Foster political reconciliation and improve governance structures to develop and implement effective climate adaptation strategies. Engage local leaders, the public sector, and international partners to support these efforts.
49. Apply for Loss and Damage Fund Support: Leverage the newly established Loss and Damage Fund at COP27 to secure financial and technical assistance for addressing climate-related challenges.
50. Strengthen International Cooperation and Accountability: Advocate for the international community, particularly high-emissions countries, to take responsibility for the climate impacts on vulnerable nations like Libya. Push for climate justice and secure funding to support Libya’s transition to sustainable development.
[1] Council on Foreign Relations, Civil Conflict in Libya, available at https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-libya.
[2] NUPI, Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet: Libya, available at https://www.nupi.no/news/climate-peace-and-security-fact-sheet-libya.
[3] Atlantic Council, Climate Profile: Libya, available at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/programs/middle-east-programs/rafik-hariri-center-for-the-middle-east/empowerme/macromena/climate-profile-libya/
[4] UN Climate Change Fact Sheet: Libya (2022), available at https://libya.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl931/files/documents/UN%20Climate%20Change%20Factsheet%20Libya.pdf
[5] NUPI, Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet: Libya, available at https://www.nupi.no/en/news/climate-peace-and-security-fact-sheet-libya
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid. See also United States Agency for International Development (USAID), ‘Climate risk profile: Libya’, Fact sheet, July 2017; and World Bank, Climate Change Knowledge Portal, ‘Libya: Country summary’, accessed 26 June 2024.
[8] UNICEF, Libya Water Scarcity and Climate Change: an analysis on WASH enabling environment in Libya (2022), [PDF] p. 4, available at https://www.unicef.org/mena/media/19321/file/Libya%20water%20scarcity%20analysis%20and%20recommendations_%20UNICEF%20Sep%202022.pdf
[9] International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), ‘Libya climate fact sheet’, [PDF] p. 7, available at https://prddsgofilestorage.blob.core.windows.net/api/documents/Libya_-_Climate_Fact_Sheet/LIBYA_Climate_Fact_Sheet_EN.pdf.
[10] IOM, Desk Review: Country Report on Migration, Environment, and Climate Change in Libya, available at https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1411/files/documents/2024-03/libya-desk-review_final29.pdf.
[11] T. Frere et al., “Climate Change and Challenges to Self- Determination: Case Studies from French Polynesia and the Republic of Kiribati” 129 The Yale Law Journal 648 (24 Feb. 2020).
[12] Worldometer, Libya Population, available at https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/libya-population/.
[13] Fowler, Gary L., Cordell, Dennis D., Brown, L. Carl, Buru, Mukhtar Mustafa and Barbour, Nevill. “Libya.” Encyclopedia Britannica, 31 Oct. 2024, https://www.britannica.com/place/Libya. Accessed 4 November 2024.
[14] United Nations Climate Action, Five ways the climate crisis impacts human security, available athttps://www.un.org/en/climatechange/science/climate-issues/human-security#:~:text=Unpredictable%20rainfall%20and%20extreme%20weather,social%2C%20economic%20and%20environmental%20factors; United Nations Security Council, Meeting Session: With Climate Crisis Generating Growing Threats to Global Peace, Security Council Must Ramp Up Efforts, Lessen Risk of Conflicts, Speakers Stress in Open Debate, SC/15318 (13 June 2023), available at https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15318.doc.htm.
[15] Ali O.M. Maka, Salem Salem, Mubbashar Mehmood, “Solar photovoltaic (PV) applications in Libya: Challenges, potential, opportunities and future perspectives,” Cleaner Engineering and Technology, Volume 5, 2021.
[16] UNDP, “Advancing Libya's Energy Transition and Climate Resilience” (11 Mar. 2024), available at https://www.undp.org/arab-states/press-releases/advancing-libyas-energy-transition-and-climate-resilience#:~:text=We%20look%20forward%20to%20cooperating,every%20facet%20of%20Libyan%20life.%22.
[17] World Bank Group, “Agriculture, forestry, and fishing, value added (% of GDP) – Libya,” available at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS?end=2023&locations=LY&start=2002.
[18] The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, “Challenges Remain for Agricultural Sector in Libya: Ways Forward”, available at https://timep.org/2022/09/02/challenges-remain-for-agricultural-sector-in-libya-ways-forward/#:~:text=International%20organizations%2C%20including%20the%20Food,the%20development%20of%20the%20sector.
[19] C. Dupire, “Turning Libya into a “Green Paradise”: young eco-entrepreneur supports rural adoption of hydroponics,” EU Neighbors (2 Sept. 2024), available at https://south.euneighbours.eu/story/turning-libya-into-a-green-paradise-young-eco-entrepreneur-supports-rural-adoption-of-hydroponics/.
[20] USAID, “USAID Unlocks the Economic Potential of Libya’s Agricultural Sector through Sustainable Energy Solutions” (25 Dec. 2024), available at https://www.usaid.gov/libya/news/dec-18-2024-usaid-unlocks-economic-potential-libyas-agricultural-sector-through-sustainable-energy-solutions.
[21] IIRC, “Libya: Conflict weakens the abilities of farmers to mitigate climate risks” (14 Apr. 2022), available at https://www.icrc.org/en/document/libya-conflict-weakens-abilities-farmers-mitigate-climate-risks.
[22] B. Brika / Desalination and Water Treatment 167 (2019) 351–358, p. 352.
[23] Ibid.
[24] “Water Use in Libya,” Fanack (25 Aug. 2020), available at https://water.fanack.com/libya/water-uses-in-libya/#_ftn4; “Water Supply in Libya: Approaching collapse levels,” Libya Tribune (21 Oct. 2022), available at https://en.minbarlibya.org/2022/10/21/water-supply-in-libya-approaching-collapse-levels/.
[25] UNDP, Libya, Focus Area: Climate Change and the Environment: https://www.undp.org/libya/environment-and-climate-change#:~:text=Libya%20is%20heavily%20susceptible%20to,productive%20sectors%20and%20food%20security.
[26] B. Brika / Desalination and Water Treatment 167 (2019) 351–358, p. 355.
[27] Ibid.
[28] UNICEF Libya, Water Scarcity and Climate Change: an analysis on WASH enabling environment in Libya (Sept. 2022), available at https://www.unicef.org/mena/media/19321/file/Libya%20water%20scarcity%20analysis%20and%20recommendations_%20UNICEF%20Sep%202022.pdf
[29] AbdulkaderAssad, “UNICEF warns of imminent water shortage in Libya,” The Libya Observer (2021), available athttps://libyaobserver.ly/news/unicef-warns-imminent-water-shortage-libya.
[30] UNDP, Libya, Focus Area: Climate Change and the Environment: https://www.undp.org/libya/environment-and-climate-change#:~:text=Libya%20is%20heavily%20susceptible%20to,productive%20sectors%20and%20food%20security.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Water Law No.3 of year 1982,
[33] World Bank Group, Gas Flaring Explained, available at https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/gasflaringreduction/gas-flaring-explained#:~:text=Thousands%20of%20gas%20flares%20at,contribute%20significantly%20to%20global%20warming.
[34] Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership (GGFR) (2020). Individual Flare Sites - Gas Flaring Volumes (mln m3/yr) for 2020. World Bank, available at https://www.ggfrdata.org.
[35] M. Darwesh & N. Hamdy, “Spotlight: Residents suffer from oil, gas pollution in eastern Libya,” Xinhuanet (29 Jan. 2019), available at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-01/29/c_137784764.htm.
[36] L. Bagnoli, “The smuggling of fuel from Libya to Europe” (2022)
[37] Raval, A.; C. Cornish and N. Munshi (2021). Oil Producers face costly transition as world looks to net-zero future. Financial Times, available at https://www.ft.com/content/27b4b7f1-9b08-4406-8119- 03a73fb6ce19.
[38] M. Brubacher (Climate Diplomacy), Climate Fragility Risk Brief – Libya (Oct. 2021), available at https://climate-diplomacy.org/sites/default/files/2021-10/csen_risk_brief_libya.pdf.
[39] Id., [PDF] p. 8.
[40] Id., [PDF] pp. 2, 8.
[41] IEA (2021). Methane Tracker Database. Libya, available at https://www.iea.org/articles/methanetracker-database.
[42] UN General Assembly, A/76/L.75, The human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment (26 July 2022).
[43] UNCCC, “Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,” available at https://unfccc.int/process/parties-non-party-stakeholders/parties-convention-and-observer-states?field_national_communications_target_id%5B514%5D=514#:~:text=Iran%20(Islamic%20Republic%20of),San%20Marino.
[44] IOM, Climate Change, Conflict and Migration (CCM) Nexus and Water Scarcity Study (Feb. 2023), available at https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1411/files/documents/2024-03/ccm-nexus-and-water-scarcity-study-final93.pdf, p. 22.
[45] Missing Migrants Project, Annual Regional Overview, pp. 1-1 (“As was the case in 2020 and 2021, the majority of deaths documented on land routes in Northern Africa during 2022 occurred in Libya (117).; On the CMR in 2022, most deaths occurred in the coasts of Libya (807), largely as a result of 46 known shipwrecks that claimed at least 713 lives. Another 94 remains of migrants washed ashore that could not be linked to known shipwrecks, signifying possible “invisible shipwrecks”3 with a higher death toll.”), available at https://missingmigrants.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl601/files/publication/file/MMP%20annual%20regional%20overview%202022%20MENA.pdf.
[46] IOM, Jun 28 2024. DTM Libya — Migrant Report 52 (March - May 2024). IOM, Libya, available at https://dtm.iom.int/reports/libya-migrant-report-52-march-may-2024#:~:text=IOM%20Libya’s%20Displacement%20Tracking%20Matrix,(March%20%2D%20May%202024).
[47] Amnesty International, “Libya: New evidence shows refugees and migrants trapped in horrific cycle of abuses” (24 Sept. 2020), available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2020/09/libya-new-evidence-shows-refugees-and-migrants-trapped-in-horrific-cycle-of-abuses/
[48] International Organization for Migration (IOM), February 2023. DTM Libya Migrant Report, Round 46. IOM, Libya, available at https://dtm.iom.int/reports/libya-migrant-report-46-january-february-2023.
[49] Ibid.
[50] NUPI, Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet: Libya (Aug. 2024), available athttps://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2024-08/02_sipri-nupi_fact_sheet_libya_august_270824.pdf.
[51] Ibid.
[52] IOM, Climate Change, Conflict and Migration (CCM) Nexus and Water Scarcity Study (Feb. 2023), available at https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1411/files/documents/2024-03/ccm-nexus-and-water-scarcity-study-final93.pdf, [PDF] p. 61.
[53] “Corte di Cassazione: la Libia non è un porto sicuro”, Melting Pot Europa (28 Feb. 2024), available at https://www.meltingpot.org/2024/02/corte-di-cassazione-la-libia-non-e-un-porto-sicuro/#. See also Corte di Cassazione dell’1 febbraio 2024 n. 4557 (Italian Court of Cassation, Judgment n. 4557, 1 Feb. 2024).
[54] IEA, “Libya,” available at https://www.iea.org/countries/libya/emissions.
[55] Ibid. (last updated, 2022).
Link on the United Nations System
Universal Periodic Review Fourth Cycle - Libya - Reference Documents on the United Nations System